This paper discusses two ways to amend the optimal lending contract under asymmetric information studied in Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) to change its long-run implications so that firm growth and exit driven by borrowing constraints exist in the long run. One way assumes that the entrepreneur has a lower discount factor than the bank, and the other assumes the bank has limited commitment. The optimal lending contracts under each variation closely resemble each other.
Introduction
A considerable body of empirical evidence suggests that many firms are constrained in their borrowing and borrowing constraints can be important determinants of firm dynamics.
1 Recent attempts to analyse, theoretically, the impact of borrowing constraints on firm dynamics (Quadrini (2004) , Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) , and Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) ) have used the optimal contract design framework -where borrowing constraints exist as a feature of an optimal long-term lending contract subject to financial frictions such as asymmetric information or limited commitment issues. This approach has been very successful in generating short-to-medium-run implications of borrowing constraints. For example, the optimal lending contract under asymmetric information studied in Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) (hereafter, CH) implies that smaller firms are more financially constrained, grow faster, but has higher probability of being liquidated. These features are consistent with the qualitative properties of firm growth and survival documented in the empirical literature. 2 However, all of these models imply that, in the long run, borrowing constraints cease to bind for firms, and hence there is no long run firm growth or exit driven by borrowing constraints. For instance, in CH, the evolution of equity values of the firm (the state variable of the recursive contract) has two absorbing states: either the firm is liquidated, or it grows in finite periods to the point where it reaches its unconstrained efficient size and will never be liquidated. This seems counterfactual: many firms face borrowing constraints even though they are large and have been in existence for long periods of time. Sensitivity of investment to cash flow is widely documented in empirical studies using data for publicly traded firms which are relatively large and mature. 3 In particular, the seminal study of Fazzari, Hubbard and Peterson (1988) finds that this sensitivity is statistically significant even for the group of firms with the largest capital stock, suggesting that large firms could also be financially constrained. Hu and Schiantarelli (1998) even find evidence that larger firms are more likely to be financially constrained.
This paper demonstrates that it is relatively straightforward to amend the CH contract to change its long-run implications so that a non-degenerate stationary distribution of firm sizes (equity values) exists, with borrowing constraints binding in the long run. In particular, two different variations to the CH framework are considered -both of which yield similar results. The first is inspired by Aiyagari and Williamson (1999) , in the context of risk sharing with private information, who show that different discount rates for the principal and the agent with the agent being more impatient can generate non-degenerate stationary distributions of expected utilities for the agent. Here, we assume a lower discount factor for the entrepreneur than for the bank and derive an analogous result. The assumption of impatient entrepreneur is also consistent with a higher exit rate generally observed for non-financial firms than for banks. If non-financial firms have higher exit rates than financial firms, they are expected to discount future cash flows more heavily. The second variation relaxes the assumption that the bank can fully commit. In CH, the entrepreneur has limited commitment in the sense that it has limited liability for repayments, while the bank is able to keep promises under all circumstances. In particular, once the firm grows to the unconstrained stage (this will be achieved in finite periods if the firm is not liquidated at an early stage) the bank will advance the unconstrained efficient amount of working capital to the firm while receiving zero repayment in every period onwards. Although full commitment on the part of the bank (the principal) is standard in the literature, it implies unlimited liability of the bank in the context. So in the second variation we allow the possibility that banks can renege on the contract if the expected discounted flow of payments to the bank implied by the contract fall below a critical level. The introduction of this limited commitment, once again, implies a non-degerate stationary distribution of firm sizes.
Intuitively, in CH, it is optimal for the firm to "front load": to repay all revenues to the bank until the equity of the firm grows to the unconstrained stage and, thereafter, to make zero repayments while the bank advances the unconstrained efficient amount of working capital to the firm in every period. (The term "equity" represents the firm's claim to future cash flows that the investment project will deliver, or the firm's stake in the joint venture. It grows as the firm makes repayments to the bank, or in other words, as the firm puts deposits in the bank.) If, however, the entrepreneur is impatient relative to the bank then the interest rate the firm earns on its deposits at the bank is lower than its time preference rate, so that the firm would not find it optimal to accumulate deposits to the level required by the CH contract for reaching the unconstrained stage. Similarly, the limited commitment assumption for the bank is equivalent to putting an upper bound on the firm's deposits at the bank, suggesting that the firm, fearing that the bank may renege, does not want to deposit too much at the bank. Both assumptions prevent the firm from accumulating deposits at the bank to the unconstrained level implied by the CH contract. As a consequence, the optimal lending contract under each variation implies long-run borrowing constraints, driving firm growth and exit in the long run.
Considering that the value functions and the policy functions associated with the two contracts exhibit the same patterns, we conduct a numerical comparison to see whether the two variations are structurally identical. The numerical results show that there are some structural differences in the computed value functions and policy functions, but the differences are modest compared with the similarities. In particular, the two contracts imply roughly identical stationary distributions of equity values for the firm.
This paper contributes to the literature on dynamic contracting in two different ways. First, it formally establishes the result that different discount rates can generate nondegenerate distributions of firm sizes in an otherwise standard CH model. The intuition for this result, as mentioned above, reflects results found in the risk-sharing models of Williamson (1998) and Williamson (1999, 2000) , and in work by Monge-Naranjo (2009), using a continuous time version of the contracting problem with limited commitment of the firm studied in Albequerque and Hopenhayn (2004) . This paper is also the first to study the implications of limited commitment on the part of the principal for optimal contract design. Most studies in the literature assume that the agent may or may not fully commit, but the principal has full commitment. 4 This study shows that the introduction of limited commitment on the principal's side can have a significant impact on the long-run properties of optimal contracts.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 characterise the optimal lending contracts under each variation. Section 4 discusses the connections between the two assumptions and presents a numerical comparison between the two contracts. Section 5 concludes. All proofs for the lemmas and propositions are provided in the Technical Appendix.
Limited Commitment of the Bank
In this section we characterise the optimal contract with limited commitment of the bank. we start with this modification since the setup of the contracting problem is quite similar to the CH contract such that certain properties of the optimal contract are more straightforward to establish. We first briefly review the contracting environment, then give the recursive formulation of the contracting problem, and finally characterise the properties of the optimal contract.
The Contracting Environment
Here is a brief review of the contracting environment, as described in CH. Time is discrete, and the time horizon is infinite. At time 0 the entrepreneur (firm) has a project which requires a fixed initial investment I 0 > 0 and a per-period investment of working capital. Once in operation, the project is subject to revenue shocks θ t in each period, where θ t ∈ {H, L} with prob{θ = H} = p. If θ t = H, the project produces revenues R(k t ), where k t is the amount of working capital invested in period t, and revenues are zero if θ t = L. The function R is assumed to be continuous, uniformly bounded from above, strictly increasing, strictly concave and continously differentiable. Revenue shocks are independent over time, and their realizations in each period are assumed to be private information for the entrepreneur. At the beginning of every period the project can be liquidated to generate a scrap value S ≥ 0. The entrepreneur's initial wealth is given by M < I 0 , implying that financial services from a lender (bank) are needed to finance the project. At time 0, the bank offers a take-it-or-leaveit contract to the entrepreneur, under which the bank helps finance the initial investment of the project and per-period working capital in exchange for repayment from the entrepreneur. In every period the entrepreneur is assumed to be liable for repayment only to the extent of current revenues, i.e., the entrepreneur has limited liability for repayments. The entrepreneur and the bank are both risk neutral.
CH discusses properties of the optimal contract under two crucial assumptions: the entrepreneur and the bank discount future cash flows at the same discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1), and both parties are able to commit to the long-term contract. This section characterises the optimal contract under the assumption that the bank has limited commitment to the contract. That is, the bank would renege on the contract without punishment if the value of the contract to itself from any period onward falls below some critical level. This critical value, denoted as B, represents the value of some outside option for the bank. B is assumed to be greater than the continuation value of the CH contract to the bank when the firm grows to the unconstrained stage, which is given byB ≡ −
, where k * denotes the unconstrained efficient amount of working capital that would be advanced by the bank if the informational friction is absent, i.e., k * = argmax k pR(k) − k. 5 It is also natural to assume that B is less than the scrap value of the project S such that the limited commitment constraint for the bank is satisfied when the bank liquidates the firm to claim the scrap value. These assumptions are summarised in Assumption 1.
Assumption 1B < B < S.
A recursive formulation of the contract
As discussed in CH, the presence of private information gives rise to a long-term contract offered by the bank, which, conditional on the history of reports of the entrepreneur h t = (θ 0 ,θ 1 , ...,θ t ), specifies a contingent policy of liquidation probabilities α t (h t−1 ), transfers from the bank to the entrepreneur in case of liquidation X t (h t−1 ), input of working capital k t (h t−1 ), and repayment from the entrepreneur to the bank in case of no liquidation τ t (h t ) to maximize the value of the contract to the bank (expected discounted net cash flow accrued to the bank).
Without the limited commitment assumption for the bank, the contracting problem possesses a recursive formulation, taking the entrepreneur's value entitlement (the value of the contract to the entrepreneur) at the beginning of a period, V , as the state variable. Following CH, V is also called the equity value of the firm throughout the discussion in the sense that it is the firm's claim to future cash flows or the firm's stake in the investment project. With limited commitment of the bank, the optimal contract must satisfy that the value of the contract to the bank at the beginning of any period is bounded below by B conditional on any history of reports of the entrepreneur. Note that the CH contract does not satisfy this constraint:
, the value of the contract to the bank isB, strictly less than B by Assumption 1. Intuitively, the limited commitment constraint is equivalent to putting an upper bound on V , since the total value of the contract is bounded above bỹ
, the maximum expected discounted profit the project can yield. Any value entitlement to the entrepreneur greater than this upper bound cannot be faithfully promised by the bank, since a violation of the limited commitment constraint would lead the bank to renege on the contract. Denote this upper bound on feasible value entitlements to the entrepreneur asV LC , where 'LC' stands for 'limited commitment', and take it as given for the 5 In CH, once the firm reaches the unconstrained stage, the bank advances the unconstrained efficient amount of working capital k * to the firm while receives zero repayment in every period such that the continuation value of the contract to the bank is given by − k * 1−δ . 5 moment. Then the optimal contract has a recursive formulation with V ≤V LC as the state variable. This argument is consistent with Phelan (1995) , where he considers an insurance contract between a firm and an agent with privately observed endowments assuming that both parties can walk away from the contract at the beginning of a period (with or without cost), and shows that the two limited commitment constraints can boil down to a restriction on the set of feasible continuation utilities for the agent such that the efficient contract is recursive.
Note that V is bounded below by zero because the limited liability constraint ensures the entrepreneur a non-negative net cash flow in every period. For a given V ∈ [0,V LC ], the bank's problem is to choose the choice variables to maximize B(V ), the value of the contract to itself, or equivalently, to maximize the total value of the contract, W (V ) ≡ V + B(V ). Since both parties have the same discount factor, using W (V ) rather than B(V ) as the objective function can simplify the formulation. This will not be the case in Section 3, where the two parties are assumed to have different discount factors.
A first decision to be made in a period is whether to liquidate the project, obtaining the scrap value S, or keep it in operation. If the project is not scrapped, the decision at the continuation stage is to choose the amount of working capital, repayment to the bank, and etc. For V ∈ [0,V LC ], a recursive formulation for the liquidation problem is given by
Here, α is the liquidation probability. As discussed in CH, a stochastic liquidation is optimal due to the non-convexity introduced by a constant scrap value. X is the transfer from the bank to the entrepreneur in case of liquidation. V c is the value entitlement to the entrepreneur contingent upon continuation, andŴ (V c ) is the value of the contract at the continuation stage. Eq. (1) is a promise-keeping constraint, stating that the contract delivers an expected value equal to V to the entrepreneur such that the bank's promise to the entrepreneur is fulfilled.
A recursive formulation for the continuation problem is given by
Here the state variable V is the value entitlement to the entrepreneur contingent on continuation, k is the amount of working capital advanced by the bank, τ is the repayment to the 
This constraint ensures that the entrepreneur truthfully reports when a high shock is realized. Note that the entrepreneur cannot misreport when a low shock is realized. Eq. (4) is the limited liability constraint for the entrepreneur. Eq. (5) and (6) are imposed to ensure that the limited commitment constraint for the bank is satisfied.
Properties of the optimal contract
Notice that the contracting problem shares the same recursive formulation as the CH contract except that the limited commitment constraints (5) and (6) are imposed. As shown below, the contract shares a lot of the properties of the CH contact, but due to the limited commitment constraint imposed, it also exhibits some crucial differences. First, givenV LC , the value functions W (V ) andŴ (V ) exhibit identical properties as in CH. That is, there exist unique W (V ) andŴ (V ) that satisfy (P as illustrated in Fig. 1 . 6 Using the properties of the value functions, we can establish the existence and uniqueness ofV LC , which has been taken as given so far. From the discussions earlier,V LC must satisfy (7), Lemma 1 establishes the existence and uniqueness ofV LC ∈ (0,Ṽ ).
Lemma 1
There exists a unique 0 <V LC <Ṽ satisfying (7).
The liquidation problem (P 
Proposition 1 There exists
It's not made clear in CH, but it's worth noting that V LC r is the maximum V that satisfiesŴ (V ) =Ŵ
. This result will be useful to establish Lemma 3 below. Now consider problem (P (5) and (6) are not binding, (P LC 2 ) would have the same formulation as the continuation problem in CH and as a result would share identical properties. The following lemma defines such a region. (5) and (6) are not binding.
Lemma 2 There exists
0 < V LC 1 ≤V LC , such that V H (V LC 1 ) =V LC . For 0 ≤ V < V LC 1 ,
It can be shown that
LC . This relationship will be established after we summarize the properties of the optimal contract on [0,
the limited liability constraint (4) is binding;
(ii) k(V ) < k * , and the incentive compatibility constraint (3) is binding;
The repayment policy stated in Part (i) implies zero consumption for the entrepreneur, i.e., a zero dividend policy for the firm as long as V H is lower than its upper boundV LC (see Fig. 4 ). This allows the equity value of the firm to reach its upper bound in the shortest possible time. Part (ii) says that the firm is borrowing constrained in the sense that the amount of working capital advanced by the bank is strictly less than its unconstrained efficient level k * , which would be achieved if the bank can also observe the revenue shocks of the firm (see Fig. 2 ). Part (iii) implies that the bank promises the entrepreneur a higher beginning-of-next-period value entitlement if a high shock is reported today, and a lower value entitlement if a low shock is reported today (see Fig. 3 ). Such report-dependent future value entitlements are crucial for inducing a truthful report from the entrepreneur when a high shock is realized. Since V H is less thanV LC on this region, it is strictly increasing. V L is nondecreasing on this region. Since V L is bounded below by zero, there might exist a region of V where V L is zero. All these properties resemble those of the CH contract on the region [0,Ṽ ). For V > V LC 1 , the limited commitment constraint (5) becomes binding. So the optimal contract exhibits different features from CH, which are summarized in Proposition 3.
7 More precisely, the properties described in Proposition 2 are identical to those of the CH contract on a region defined as [0, 
e., the limited commit constraint (5) is binding;
(ii) k(V ) < k * , and the incentive compatibility constraint (3) is binding; Part (iii) is the most crucial result that distinguishes the current contract from CH and leads to firm dynamics in the long run. Note that (iii), together with Proposition 2(iii), states that V L (V ) < V for all feasible values of V , including the highest valueV LC (see 
Figure 4: Repayment and dividends for the contract with limited commitment Fig. 3 ). This implies that starting from any non-zero level, the equity value of the firm can reach any level in its state space [0,V LC ], in particular, it can fall down to the liquidation region [0, V LC r ] following a sequence of low revenue shocks. As a result, the firm is borrowing constrained throughout its life-cycle and faces a positive probability of being eventually liquidated. Since the policy functions V H and V L are single-valued, the equity dynamics dictated by the contract, as shown in Fig. 3 , implies a unique stationary distribution of equity values for the firm that exhibit mobility within the ergodic set [0,V LC ]. Therefore there are endogenous firm exit and firm growth in the long run. This constitutes a crucial difference from CH, where V H (Ṽ ) ≥Ṽ and V L (Ṽ ) =Ṽ , implying that once a firm's equity value reachesṼ it will never fall down such that the firm ceases to be borrowing constrained and will never be liquidated. 8 As stated there, the evolution process of equity values has two absorbing states, V = 0 and V ≥Ṽ : "Eventually, either the first one is reached and the firm is liquidated, or the second one is reached and borrowing constraints cease forever". As a consequence, there are no borrowing constraints or firm dynamics in the long run.
The optimal repayment and dividends policies also exhibit important differences from the CH contract. Part (iv), together with Proposition 2(i), implies that the repayment of the firm to the bank when a high shock is reported is always greater than zero as long as
, suggesting that the bank charges a lower repayment from the firm once V H cannot be further raised to reward the firm for truthful report of a high shock. Part (v) implies that the dividends of the firm
is strictly increasing and τ (V ) is strictly decreasing. So as its equity value reaches some level on [V LC 1 ,V LC ], the firm starts to pay dividends if a high shock is realized and the amount of dividends is strictly increasing in the firm's equity value. These features are illustrated in Fig. 4 . Recall that an optimal repayment policy described in CH is for the firm to transfer all the revenues to the bank and pay zero dividends for V <Ṽ and atṼ the firm pays zero repayment to the bank and all revenues are paid as dividends. This obviously contrasts with the repayment and dividends policies here implied by (iv) and (v). However, this is not the unique optimal repayment policy for the CH contract. Another optimal repayment policy and the corresponding dividends policy are shown in Fig. 4 .
9 Note that they share similar patterns as the optimal repayment and dividends policies for the limited commitment contract. That is, the firm transfers all revenues to the bank and pays zero dividends as long as V H is less than its upper bound, and once V H reaches its upper bound, the repayment 8 In Fig. 3 , for the CH contract, V H higher thanṼ is set toṼ for illustration purpose. 9 The repayment and dividends policies for the CH contract shown in Fig. 4 are obtained by imposing an upper boundṼ for the state variable, i.e., imposing a state space [0,Ṽ ] for the contract. In CH, no upper bound for V is imposed in deriving the properties of the optimal contract despite the fact that the expected discounted cash flow to the firm is naturally bounded byṼ , the maximum expected discounted revenue the project can yield. As a result, the policy functions for declines while the dividends increases. However, the important difference remains: for the CH contract, repayment becomes zero once the firm's equity value reaches certain level, while repayment is strictly positive throughout the state space for the limited commitment contract. This feature of the repayment policy ensures that the limited commitment contract delivers a value to the bank not lower than B.
Impatient Entrepreneur
This section characterises the optimal contract assuming that the entrepreneur has a lower discount factor δ e < δ, that is, the entrepreneur discounts future cash flows more heavily than the bank or in other words the entrepreneur is more impatient than the bank.
A recursive formulation
Again, the contracting problem has a recursive formulation, taking the value of the contract to the entrepreneur V as the state variable. An upper bound for V is the maximum expected discounted cash flow the project can deliver for the entrepreneur,Ṽ IE ≡ pR(k * )
1−δ e <Ṽ , where 'IE' stands for 'impatient entrepreneur'. For a given V ∈ [0,Ṽ IE ], the contracting problem is to specify contract terms to maximize B(V ), the value of the contract to the bank.
The recursive formulation for the liquidation problem is then given by
And the recursive formulation for the continuation problem is given by
Properties of the Optimal Contract
First, by standard arguments of dynamic programming, there exist unique B(V ) andB(V ) that satisfy (P 
such that B ≥B ≥B. , implying that a lower discount factor for the entrepreneur reduces the value of the contract to the bank and consequently reduces the total value of the contract at all levels of V > 0.
10 This property is similar as the limited commitment contract discussed earlier. Also notice from Fig. 5 that there exists a region of V such that the value of the contract to the bank increases with the value of the contract to the firm, so both parties would find it beneficial to renegotiate the contract once the firm's equity value evolves to this region. Therefore like the original CH contract, the contract with impatient entrepreneur is not renegotiation-proof. The limited commitment contract discussed in Section 2 is also not renegotiation-proof, though it's not clearly shown in Fig. 1 .
11
To characterise other properties of the contract, we impose the following assumption.
Assumption 2 S <Ṽ
IE +B.
Assumption 2 implies that S <Ṽ IE + B(Ṽ IE ), since B(Ṽ IE ) ≥B. So this assumption is to ensure the scrap value S strictly less than the total value of the contract atṼ IE so that liquidation in the current period is not optimal when the firm's equity value reaches its upper bound. It is comparable to the assumption in CH that S <W , withW being the total value of the contract atṼ .
Characterising the solution to (P

IE
1 ) Similar to the discussions for the limited commitment contract, we will divide the state space into several regions and characterise the solutions to (P exists. Note thatB (V IE r ) ≥B
Proposition 4 There exists
Using these properties, it can be shown thatV is strictly less thanṼ IE . This is established in Lemma 5.
is not necessarily zero so that B(V ) andB(V ) are not necessarily equal (see Fig. 5 ). To see this, consider (P IE 1 ) for two cases: α = 0 and α > 0. If α = 0, the value of the contract to the bank isB(V ). If α > 0, since V +B(V ) attains its maximum atV , setting V c =V is optimal. Then the value to the bank is given by αS +(1−α)[V +B(V )]−V , which is obtained by substituting out αX using (8). It's clear that ifV +B(V ) > V +B(V ) (this only holds with weak inequality by the weak concavity ofB), a small positive α exists such that αS + (1 − α)[V +B(V )] − V >B(V ), i.e., zero liquidation probability is not optimal. A sufficient condition for the strict inequality to hold is the strict concavity of B on [V ,Ṽ IE ], which is not easy to establish in the current context. However, we will not spend further time on this because the properties of the optimal contract on this region are irrelevant to the long run dynamics of the firm, as will become clear in the subsection below.
Characterising the solution to (P
IE
)
In this subsection, we discuss the properties of the optimal capital advancement, repayment policy and equity dynamics by examining (P IE 2 ). Again, we divide the state space into several regions, and on each region we show that certain constraints of (P IE 2 ) are binding such that the problem can be reduced and certain properties can be identified.
First, as in Section 2, we want to define a region of V on which the optimal contract shares similar properties as in CH. In particular, the optimal repayment to the bank equals the firm's total revenue in a period, i.e., the limited liability constraint (11) is binding. An investigation of (P IE 2 ) reveals that as long as V H is less than some critical value, raising both V H and the repayment τ can strictly increase the value of the contract to the bank such that the limited liability constraint can be binding. This critical value for V H , denoted asV IE , is defined as the minimum V that satisfies B (V ) = − . Before we formally establish these properties in Proposition 5, we first prove the following result, which will be useful in the proof of Proposition 5.
Lemma 6 is comparable to the result in CH that the total value of the contract under all contingencies is no more than its unconstrained efficient level that would be achieved if the informational friction is absent. 12 This property holds for all V in CH by the monotonicity of 12 In CH, the total value of the contract with symmetric information is given byW ≡
, which provides an upper bound for the value of the contract with asymmetric information. That is,
W . In the current context, an analogue to this property can be shown to hold for V ∈ [0,V IE ]. The properties of the solution to (P (ii) k(V ) < k * , and the incentive compatibility constraint (10) is binding;
A difference from the properties of the limited commitment contract as described in Proposition 2 is that when a low shock is reported today, the entrepreneur's value entitlement for next period is not necessarily lower than today's value entitlement. That is,
. Due to more heavy discounting, the entrepreneur has an incentive to demand a higher future value entitlement even when a low shock is reported today. This would be also desirable to the bank if an increase in the firm's value entitlement delivers a higher value to the bank, which can happen at lower values of V . The smaller δ e is relative to δ, the more likely this can be the case.
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The following lemma establishes a similar relationship among V Fig. 7 .
We have shown in Proposition 5 that the firm is borrowing constrained if its equity value V ∈ [0, V IE 1 ]. Then it's natural to ask whether there exists a level of V such that the firm is no longer borrowing constrained when its equity value reaches this level. In CH, this threshold is given byṼ . For the current contract, this value turns out to be theV defined earlier, as will become clear below. For V ∈ [V IE 1 ,V ), it can be shown that the incentive compatibility constraint continues to be binding, but the limited liability constraint is not necessarily binding. The properties of the contract on this region are characterised in Proposition 6 and illustrated in Fig. 6-8 .
Proposition 6 For any
* , and the incentive compatibility constraint (10) is binding.
( . In particular, the optimal policy functions for V H and V L , as shown in Fig. 7 , imply a non-degenerate stationary distribution of equity values. To see this, note thatV Aiyagari and Williamson (1999) , where they study optimal risk sharing under private information and show that, with impatient agent, the optimal contract implies a unique non-degenerate stationary distribution for expected utilities of the agent.
For
e., the firm ceases to be borrowing constrained. To see this, suppose that k(V ) < k * for some V ∈ [V ,Ṽ IE ]. Then the first-order condition 13 This result can be seen from equation (21) in the Technical Appendix. Note that with δ e < δ, if (9) and (11) respectively. By the concavity ofB,
Since the firm is no longer borrowing constrained, by the concavity of B, V
, implying that τ (V ) = 0 on this region (see Fig. 8 ). Notice that {Ṽ IE } is also an ergodic set, but as long as the initial equity value of the firm is less thanṼ IE , the stationary distribution of equity values implied by the contract will put zero probability onṼ IE . Note that the initial equity value of the firm V 0 has to satisfyB(V 0 ) ≥ I 0 − M for the bank to be willing to enter the contractual relationship with the firm. This participation constraint ensures that V 0 <Ṽ IE . 
A Comparison between Limited Commitment and Impatient Entrepreneur
From the discussions in Section 2 and 3, we see that the contract with limited commitment of the bank and the contract with impatient entrepreneur share very similar properties. In comparison to the original CH contract, both modifications lead to a downward shift in the value functions; the evolution process of the firm's equity values under both modifications has a unique stationary distribution exhibiting mobility; the firm is financially constrained throughout its life-cycle and has a positive probability of being liquidated eventually; and the firm makes a positive repayment to the bank if a high revenue shock is realized throughout its life-cycle. In the optimal contracting literature, it is typically assumed that the principal has full commitment in the sense that it can fully honor their contracts under all circumstances. This study is the first to assume limited commitment on the principal's side and explore its implications for optimal contract design. The results discussed earlier show that limited commitment for the bank yields properties that closely resemble those from impatient entrepreneur, suggesting that the two assumptions are closely related. On the one hand, both assumptions prevent the firm from accumulating too much deposits at the bank such that the firm's equity value is bounded above byV LC andV IE respectively in equilibrium. On the other hand, both assumptions put a lower bound on the value of the contract to the bank: limited commitment for the bank explicitly puts a lower bound while impatient entrepreneur implicitly puts a lower bound on the value of the contract to the bank. To see the latter, note from Fig. 5 that the value of the contract to the bank is bounded below by B(V IE ). For
a given lower bound B, a δ e can be found such that the contract with impatient entrepreneur implies the same lower bound on value to the bank. Recall that the impatient entrepreneur assumption stems from a lower interest rate on bank deposits than the time preference rate of the firm, where the latter reflects the average return on investment opportunities the firm has access to. So the assumption of impatient entrepreneur is consistent with the empirical observation that bank deposits typically pay a lower return than other investment assets. The close resembleness between these two assumptions imply that the assumption of limited commitment for the bank may be well rooted in the practice of banking.
Considering the similarities and connections discussed above, it's interesting to ask whether these two variations of the original CH contract are structurally identical. That is, for a given B, whether there exists a δ e such that the contract with impatient entrepreneur yields identical value functions, policy functions, and stationary distribution of equity values to the contract with limited commitment of the bank, or equivalently, for a given δ e , whether there exists a B such that the limited commitment contract yields identical value functions, policy functions and stationary distribution to the contract with impatient entrepreneur. If not, how do they differ under the two modifications? Since both contracting problems cannot be solved analytically, there are no analytical results to these questions. So a numerical comparison between the two contracts is conducted to give some insights.
To compare the two contracts, we take the contract with impatient entrepreneur that is solved earlier and illustrated in Fig. 5-8 as given. Denote the computedV IE asV . Then using the same parameterization for the limited commitment contract, we try to find B such that the limited commitment contract yields aV LC equal toV . That is, for a given δ e , we iterate on B such that the limited commitment contract yields the same ergodic set of equity values as the contract with impatient entrepreneur. The computed value functions and policy functions for the two contracts are plotted in Fig. 9-12 .
First, Fig. 11 shows that the policy functions for V H and V L implied by the two contracts are very close to each other, implying that the two contracts would generate a similar stationary distribution of equity values. However, there does exist minor differences in the equity dynamics. Notice that V H is a bit higher under the contract with impatient entrepreneur, suggesting that a higher future value entitlement is required to induce truthful report from the entrepreneur due to more heavy discounting by the entrepreneur.
The value functions and other policy functions exhibit more significant differences. Fig.  9 shows that the total value of the contract with impatient entrepreneur is consistently lower than its corresponding value with limited commitment, implying that the value of the contract to the bank is also consistently lower with impatient entrepreneur. The reason underlying this result is clearly shown in Fig 10, where the amount of working capital advanced from the bank is found to be higher under the contract with impatient entrepreneur and the difference is more significant for higher equity values, while the repayment to the bank, as shown in Fig. 12 , is not so much different from the limited commitment contract. Fig. 12 also shows that once the firm starts to pay dividends, the dividends under the contract with impatient entrepreneur are consistently higher than dictated by the limited commitment contract. This explains why the capital advancement is higher with impatient entrepreneur. Since the entrepreneur discounts future cash flows more heavily, a higher current consumption (dividends of the firm) is preferred, which requires a larger amount of working capital The numerical results clearly show that the two contracts are not equivalent to each other. There are structural differences in the computed value functions and policy functions. However, as demonstrated in Fig. 9-12 , the differences are modest compared with the similarities between the two contracts. A natural subsequence research is to calibrate the two versions of the model and quantitatively evaluate their differences and similarities and the resultant quantitative implications for firm dynamics. 16 
Conclusions
The CH model provides a very useful framework for analysing the impact of endogenous borrowing constraints on firm dynamics. While the original version of the model implies the non-existence of borrowing constraints in the long-run, it can be adapted in relatively straightforward ways to remove this implication. This paper illustrates two different ways of doing this, and draws out their implications for the optimal lending contract and the implied Figure 12 : Repayment and dividends for the contracts with limited commitment and impatient entrepreneur firm dynamics. The implications are quite similar theoretically and numerical comparisons also show them to be close quantitatively. This suggests that a certain amount of robustness exists in the framework.
Since the two modified contracts imply long run borrowing constraints and firm dynamics, they can easily be incorporated into industry or general equilibrium settings to study the quantitative implications of endogenous financing constraints for industry dynamics or the aggregate economy. Existing quantitative studies on the aggregate consequences of endogenous financing constraints include Cooley, Marimon and Quadrini (2004) and Smith and Wang (2006) , where the former incorporates an optimal lending contract with limited commitment of firms while the latter incorporates a CH type optimal lending contract into a general equilibrium model. In both studies, exogenous exit of firms is introduced to avoid degeneracy in the long run. This paper provides two alternative methods of avoiding this degeneracy, and it would be interesting to compare their empirical implications.
Technical Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 : Consider a sequence of candidates forV 
Proof of Lemma 2
Then (4) is not binding, otherwise, (2) would imply thatV (4) is not binding, increasing τ (V ) and V H (V ) in a way that keeps all constraints hold can strictly increase the total value of the contract, since W is strictly increasing. This is a contradiction to optimality. So
Proof of Proposition 2 : (i) For V = 0, this is obvious. Consider (P LC 2 ) for an arbitrary
, since W is strictly increasing, total value of the contract can be strictly increased by increasing τ (V ) and V H (V ) in a way that keeps all constraints hold. So τ (V ) = R(k(V )) for any V < V LC 1 . By the continuity of τ and k, the equality also holds for V = V 
The first-order condition for V H (V ) is given by
. By the strict convexity of R −1 ,
It follows from (13) 
Proof of Lemma
. Since both (3) and (4) are binding, the problem can be reduced tô
). By the Envelope condition,
. So we haveŴ (V 
LC , and the promising keeping constraint (2) becomes
a slight decrease in k(V ) and a slight increase in V L (V ) can achieve a higher surplus while keeping all constraints in (P
, otherwise, a slight increase in k and τ in a way that keeps R(k) − τ unchanged can strictly increase the total surplus.
(
and (4) can be rewritten as δV
) and (P LC 2 ) can be reduced to
The first order condition for V L is given by
where γ ≥ 0 is the Lagrangian multiplier on (14) . By the Envelope condition,
Note that V (14) is not binding since k(V ) > 0. Then γ = 0 and it follows from (15) and (16) (15) holds with equality. It follows from (15) and (16) that 
is strictly increasing and
is non-decreasing in V .
Proof of Lemma 4 : Consider (P
Then it follows from the first-order condition with respect
≥ 0, where λ and γ ≥ 0 are the Lagrangian multipliers on (9) and (11) respectively. Since
Proof of Lemma 5 :
where λ, µ ≥ 0 and γ ≥ 0 are the Lagrangian multipliers on (9), (10), and (11) 
, which is strictly positive. Then by (9) 
, then slightly lowering τ (V IE ) and V H (V IE ) can keep all constraints hold while achieve a higher surplus for the bank. So
and it is optimal to set V H (V IE ) =V IE . Therefore,
where the "≤" follows from the concavity of B, and the second last "=" follows from the promise-keeping constraint (9) . Since V IE r <V IE <V , we have So we have 
Since
and V L (V ) satisfies the first order conditions
To show that V H (V ) is strictly increasing on [0, V 
Proof of Proposition 6 :
We first write down the first-order conditions for (P IE 2 ), which will be used intensively in the proof. For any V > 0, form the Lagrangian:
where λ, µ ≥ 0 and γ ≥ 0 are the Lagrangian multipliers on (9), (10), and (11) respectively.
where k(V ) = R
by (9) and (10) . Suppose there exist V < V such that 
